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EXPANDING THE AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DEFENSE TO
INCLUDE POST-TERMINATION MISCONDUCT
HOLLY G. EUBANKS*
INTRODUCTION
When a former employee brings a lawsuit against his or her previous
employer claiming discriminatory treatment or wrongful discharge, the
employer will immediately start preparing its defense. Now, what happens
if that employer discovers that the plaintiff had previously committed some
offense or misconduct that would have led to termination had the employer
known? Can the employer use this information as a part of its defense to
the discrimination lawsuit? In 1995, the Supreme Court established the
after-acquired evidence defense as applied to federal anti-discrimination
employment statutes in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Company.1 The defense generally requires an employer to establish that it would
have fired the former employee because of the employee’s wrongdoing if
the employer had known of the misconduct prior to termination.2 Thus, the
employer needs to establish that the wrongdoing did in fact occur, that the
employer was unaware of the wrongdoing prior to the decision to terminate, and that the wrongdoing would have resulted in termination based on
the employer’s actual employment practices.3 If the defendant establishes
these elements, then the Supreme Court determined that in the typical case,
the remedies of front pay and reinstatement should be unavailable and that
the calculation of backpay should end on the date the wrongdoing was discovered.4 In addition, the Supreme Court indicated that courts should also
consider any “extraordinary equitable circumstances that affect the legitimate interests of either party” when fashioning the plaintiff’s remedy.5
Since the Supreme Court’s formulation of the defense, lower federal
courts have been forced to determine the boundaries of the defense as ap-

* J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology.
1. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995).
2. See Melissa Hart, Retaliatory Litigation Tactics: The Chilling Effects of “After-Acquired
Evidence”, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 401, 414 (2008).
3. See generally id. at 429-31.
4. See McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362.
5. Id.
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plied to various situations and factually distinct cases. These courts have
generally agreed that the defense applies to situations of resume and application fraud, as well as on-the-job misconduct like that at issue in McKennon.6 However, federal courts have been unsure of how to handle other
expansions of the defense, in particular, whether the defense is applicable
to situations of post-termination misconduct. For example, does the defense
apply when an employee steals confidential documents from his employer
after his termination? Alternatively, does the defense apply when the employee engages in illegal conduct after termination that makes the employee unsuitable for reinstatement? Relatively few federal courts have
evaluated the potential expansion of the after-acquired evidence defense,
and those courts have taken various positions on the issue.
The after-acquired evidence defense should include the plaintiff’s
post-termination misconduct when the defendant establishes it would have
fired the plaintiff for the misconduct because this type of conduct potentially falls within the extraordinary equitable considerations that McKennon
instructed federal courts to consider when determining the appropriate
damages. Post-termination misconduct should only affect the available
remedies and not the employer’s liability for unlawful discrimination.
However, the post-termination misconduct should not be attributable to the
defendant’s discriminatory actions or wrongful termination because allowing this sort of misconduct by the plaintiff to limit remedies would ignore
the important purposes behind federal anti-discrimination employment
laws. Thus, the McKennon Court’s framework of the after-acquired evidence defense in limiting back pay and barring reinstatement or front pay
should apply to the plaintiff’s wrongdoing that occurs after termination,
just as it applies to on-the-job misconduct and resume or application fraud.
This Note argues that the after-acquired evidence defense should expand to include a plaintiff’s post-termination misconduct when the misconduct does not directly flow from the unlawful discrimination or retaliation.
Part I will examine the legal environment prior to McKennon, in particular
the circuit split concerning the after-acquired evidence defense’s effect on
liability, as well as the Supreme Court’s resolution of the circuit split and
its formulation of the defense in McKennon. It will also consider the generally accepted application of the defense to resume fraud as well as on the
job misconduct. Part II will examine federal court opinions that have considered including post-termination misconduct in the after-acquired evidence defense. The reasons of the federal courts for expanding or not

6. See Hart, supra note 2, at 426-27.
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expanding the defense will be discussed in detail. Finally, Part III will articulate why the Supreme Court’s formulation of the after-acquired evidence defense and the purpose of equitable remedies, particularly front pay,
support the inclusion and consideration of post-termination misconduct that
is not attributable to the discrimination claim and that makes the plaintiff
ineligible for reinstatement.
I. THE SUPREME COURT FORMULATED THE AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
DEFENSE IN MCKENNON.
A. Prior to McKennon, the Circuit Courts Were Split on the Effect of AfterAcquired Evidence on Liability.
In the late 1980s, employers commonly used the after-acquired evidence defense in employment discrimination litigation, and federal courts
generally accepted the defense as a complete bar on liability and denied
any recovery.7 The Tenth Circuit in Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company articulated this view by determining that afteracquired evidence of employee misconduct could not be ignored because
even though the after-acquired evidence was not the cause of the employee
discharge, it was relevant to the plaintiff’s claim of injury.8 Summers found
after-acquired evidence cases to be similar to mixed-motive cases because
both have a lawful and an unlawful justification for the termination.9 For
mixed-motive cases, there is no remedy if the lawful motive for termination
was sufficient to justify termination on its own.10 The Summers Court
compared the situation of after-acquired evidence sufficient to lead to the
employee’s termination to “the hypothetical wherein a company doctor is
fired because of his age, race, religion, and sex and the company, in defending a civil rights action, thereafter discovers that the discharged employee was not a ‘doctor.’”11 The Tenth Circuit found that the plaintiff,
whose misconduct was discovered after termination, was in the same position as the “masquerading doctor” and therefore was not entitled to any
relief.12

7. Id. at 405-06.
8. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 1988) abrogated by
McKennon, 513 U.S. 352. Here, the Defendant discovered that the Plaintiff had falsified many company
records and that 18 of the falsifications had occurred after Plaintiff’s probation, in which he was warned
that any future falsifications would result in discharge. Id. at 702-03.
9. See id. at 705-07.
10. Id. at 705.
11. Id. at 708.
12. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the Tenth Circuit’s approach to
after-acquired evidence.13 The Eleventh Circuit found that the Summers
opinion ignored the lapse of time that occurred between the decision to
terminate and the discovery of the after-acquired evidence that provided a
legitimate motive for the decision.14 The time lapse makes after-acquired
evidence distinct from mixed-motive cases, where both a legitimate and an
illegitimate motive played a role in the decision to terminate employment.15
The Supreme Court had previously determined that the defendant would
not be liable in a mixed-motive case if the defendant could establish that
the same decision would have been made absent the illegitimate motive.16
However, the Eleventh Circuit did not find this logic applicable to afteracquired evidence because in using the mixed-motive logic, the Summers
Court “excuses all liability based on what hypothetically would have occurred absent the alleged discriminatory motive assuming the employer had
knowledge that it would not acquire until sometime during the litigation
arising from the discharge.”17 This view violates the principle of federal
anti-discrimination laws that the “plaintiff should be left in no worse a position than if she had not been a member of a protected class or engaged in
protected opposition to an unlawful employment practice.”18
Instead, the Eleventh Circuit determined that after-acquired evidence
is relevant to the available relief and remedies, which should be determined
on a case-by-case basis.19 Courts need to balance the employer’s right to
make business decisions for lawful reasons with the need to make the
plaintiff whole after discrimination.20 The plaintiff, in this case, lied on her
employment application concerning a previous conviction for possession of
cocaine and marijuana.21 Assuming this is sufficient misconduct for the
defendant to discharge the plaintiff, then reinstatement and front pay are
inappropriate remedies because they would infringe on the defendant’s
right to lawfully discharge employees and would put the plaintiff in a better
position beyond making her whole.22 However, the remedy of backpay
should remain available unless the defendant can establish that it would
13. Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., Inc., 968 F.2d 1174, 1181 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated, 32 F.3d
1489 (11th Cir. 1994).
14. Id. at 1179.
15. Id. at 1181.
16. See id. at 1180. See also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1989).
17. Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1179.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1181.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1176-77.
22. Id. at 1182.
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have discovered the after-acquired evidence prior to the end of the backpay
period without the litigation.23
The Third Circuit also weighed in on the debate and took a similar
stance to the Eleventh Circuit.24 The Third Circuit determined that afteracquired evidence should have absolutely no bearing at the liability stage of
employment discrimination claims because the legitimate reason for the
adverse employment action did not motivate the employer in any way at
the time of the decision.25 In addition, the victims of employment discrimination have clearly suffered real injury beyond that of the adverse employment action; they were unlawfully discriminated against.26 The Court articarticulated its disagreement with Summers by arguing that “to maintain that
a victim of employment discrimination has suffered no injury is to deprecate the federal right transgressed and to heap insult (“You had it coming”)
upon injury.”27 Federal courts need to provide a remedy for the violation of
a federal right,28 especially in light of the public interest in punishing unlawful discrimination in order to deter future occurrences.29 However, after-acquired evidence of application fraud or employee misconduct on the
job is relevant at the remedial stage of the litigation.30 Generally, courts
should not cut off backpay prior to the date of judgment unless the employer can demonstrate that it would have discovered the misconduct outside of
the litigation.31 For other remedies, especially reinstatement, the Third
Circuit emphasized the importance of considering the employer’s interest
in making choices for legitimate business purposes because the federal
laws against employment discrimination were not designed to unnecessarily interfere with employer free choice.32
B. The Supreme Court Resolved the Circuit Split in McKennon and Defined
the Parameters of the After-Acquired Evidence Defense.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement
among the Circuit Courts on whether wrongful conduct that would have

23. Id.
24. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1228 (3d Cir.1994), vacated, 514
U.S. 1034 (1995).
25. Id. at 1228.
26. Id. at 1232.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 1234-35.
30. Id. at 1238.
31. Id. at 1239-40.
32. Id. at 1240.
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resulted in discharge, discovered after an employee has been discharged in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) bars all
of the plaintiff’s relief.33 To evaluate the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, the Supreme Court had to assume that the defendant did indeed
violate the ADEA and that the plaintiff’s misconduct was severe enough to
result in termination.34 The Supreme Court determined that the afteracquired evidence could not bar all relief because it could not completely
disregard an ADEA violation.35 However, as the Eleventh and Third Circuits found, the employee’s wrongdoing was relevant at the remedial
stage.36
The plaintiff in McKennon brought an action under the ADEA when
she was terminated from employment at age sixty-two.37 The ADEA makes
it unlawful for an employer to discharge or discriminate against an employee because of the employee’s old age.38 During the plaintiff’s deposition,
she testified that prior to her termination she copied and brought home
several confidential documents concerning her employer’s financial state.39
In response to the deposition, the defendant notified the plaintiff again that
she was terminated based on her testimony regarding the removal and copying of company records and the defendant then used this information to
bring a motion for summary judgment.40 The District Court granted the
motion for summary judgment, finding that her misconduct was grounds
for termination and barring all relief, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.41
The Supreme Court began by considering the purpose of the ADEA,
finding that Congress enacted the ADEA as part of a broader effort to
“eradicate discrimination in the workplace.”42 The remedial measures in
the ADEA as well as other federal anti-discrimination employment statutes
were designed to deter unlawful discrimination as well as compensate victims of unlawful discrimination for their injuries.43 These objectives, specifically deterrence, would not be served if after-acquired evidence of
33. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 356 (1995).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 356-57. Here, the Supreme Court effectively overruled Summers v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
36. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 361.
37. Id. at 354.
38. Id. at 355.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 357. This broader statutory purpose is also encompassed in other federal statutes enacted to protect employees in the workplace such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Equal Pay Act of 1963. Id.
43. Id. at 358.
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employee wrongdoing that would have resulted in termination operated as
a complete bar to relief for a violation under the Act.44
In addition, the Supreme Court determined that after-acquired evidence cases are not like mixed-motive cases.45 In Mt. Healthy, the Supreme
Court previously found that an employee could not recover in a suit against
an employer who had both a lawful and unlawful reason for the termination
when the lawful reason alone would have justified termination.46 Here, in
an after-acquired evidence case, the misconduct was not known at the time
of the termination, and the assumption is that the unlawful motive was the
only reason for the termination.47 Thus, “[t]he employer could not have
been motivated by knowledge it did not have and it cannot now claim that
the employee was fired for the nondiscriminatory reason.”48 The afteracquired evidence, then, is not relevant to the defendant’s liability.49
However, after liability is established, the Supreme Court determined
that the after-acquired evidence was relevant to the ultimate remedy.50
Courts must consider both the legitimate interests of the employer and the
employee, and to advance the legitimate interests of the employer, the employee’s wrongdoing must be considered in the remedial stage.51 The
ADEA prohibits discrimination; it is not intended to regulate the workplace
generally or constrain employers from considering business priorities in
their employment decisions.52 Courts should take “account of the lawful
prerogatives of the employer in the usual course of its business and the
corresponding equities that it has arising from the employee’s wrongdoing.”53 The Supreme Court was attempting to strike a balance between the
civil rights of the employee and the business prerogatives of the employer.54
The Supreme Court provided some general guidelines for courts in determining the effect of after-acquired evidence on the available remedies.
The proper boundaries of remedial relief in the general class of cases
where, after termination, it is discovered that the employee has engaged

44. Id.
45. Id. at 359.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 359-60.
48. Id. at 360.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 360-61.
51. Id. at 361 (“The employee’s wrongdoing must be taken into account, we conclude, lest the
employer’s legitimate concerns be ignored.”).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Hart, supra note 2, at 411.

830

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 89:2

in wrongdoing must be addressed by the judicial system in the ordinary
course of further decisions, for the factual permutations and the equitable
considerations they raise will vary from case to case.55

The Supreme Court did indicate that generally, reinstatement and front
pay would not be appropriate remedies because “[i]t would be both inequitable and pointless to order the reinstatement of someone the employer
would have terminated, and will terminate, in any event and upon lawful
grounds.”56 As for the determination of a backpay award, “[o]nce an employer learns about employee wrongdoing that would lead to a legitimate
discharge,” the employer is not required “to ignore the information, even if
it is acquired during the course of discovery in a suit against the employer
and even if the information might have gone undiscovered absent the
suit.”57 Trial courts should calculate backpay “from the date of the unlawful discharge to the date the new information was discovered.”58 The Supreme Court emphasized that federal courts should consider “extraordinary
equitable circumstances that affect the legitimate interests of either party.”59 Furthermore, in order to rely upon the after-acquired evidence of
wrongdoing, an employer “must first establish that the wrongdoing was of
such severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on
those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the discharge.”60
C. The After-Acquired Evidence Defense in Practice as it Applies to Onthe-Job Misconduct and Resume Fraud.
After McKennon, lower federal courts had to expand on the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the defense and apply the general guidelines to
many different factual scenarios. First, federal courts had to determine what
the employer had to establish to assert the defense. The defendant must
establish that the employee’s alleged misconduct actually occurred.61 In
addition, the Ninth Circuit articulated that an employer must demonstrate
that it would have terminated the employee, not simply could have.62 This
requires an inquiry into the standards articulated in the employee handbook
55. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 361. It is important to note that the Supreme Court refers to “wrongdoing.” This concept will be discussed later in the Note. See infra Part III.A.
56. Id. at 361-62.
57. Id. at 362.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 362-363.
61. See O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1996); see also
Nemeth v. Citizens Fin. Group, 08-CV-15326, 2012 WL 3262876, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 9, 2012).
62. O’Day, 79 F.3d at 759.
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concerning employee conduct and disciplinary proceedings, but it also
requires an examination of the employer’s actual employment practices
because “employers often say they will discharge employees for certain
misconduct while in practice they do not.”63 Hence, the defendant must
have been unaware of the misconduct prior to the decision to terminate
because if the employer previously ignored the information, it would be
incapable of establishing that it would have terminated the employee. The
employer must prove this element by a preponderance of the evidence to
assert the after-acquired evidence defense.64 This element becomes a question of fact in many cases because it is difficult to determine if an employer
would have fired the employee rather than could have fired the employee
for the misconduct.65 Other federal courts have generally accepted the
Ninth Circuit’s formulation of these requirements.66
Next, federal courts had to determine the point during litigation that
the defendant could assert the defense. Federal courts have expressed divergent views on exactly when the defendant must present the defense, in
particular whether the defendant can amend its answer to include the defense later in the litigation.67 The defense looks like an affirmative defense
since it bars specific damages; however, a defendant must include an affirmative defense in its answer to be valid.68 A few courts have followed
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in this respect and have refused to
allow defendants to raise the defense at a later time.69 However, most federal courts have recognized the unusual nature of the defense in that it is
typically not apparent until some discovery has been conducted.70 These
courts generally permit the defendant to assert the defense at a later time,
but the burden of proof is affirmatively placed on the defendant to establish
the elements of the defense.71 The courts base their decision on a variety of
factors including the seriousness of the alleged misconduct, how long it
takes the defendant to assert the defense, and the availability of additional
discovery for the plaintiff to respond to the alleged misconduct.72
63. Id.
64. Id. at 761. Initially, there was some debate on whether the standard should be the clear and
convincing evidence standard. See Christine Neylon O’Brien, The Law of After-Acquired Evidence in
Employment Discrimination Cases: Clarification of the Employer’s Burden, Remedial Guidance, and
the Enigma of Post-Termination Misconduct, 65 UMKC L. REV. 159, 161-62 (1996).
65. See Hart, supra note 2, at 419.
66. See, e.g., Nemeth, 08-CV-15326, 2012 WL 3262876, at *4.
67. Hart, supra note 2, at 419.
68. Id. at 419-20.
69. Id. at 420.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 421.
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In addition, federal courts have had to determine what type of misconduct is included in the defense. McKennon clearly supports the proposition
that the after-acquired evidence defense includes on-the-job misconduct,
but federal courts have also accepted the proposition that it applies to resume and application fraud as well.73 At first, federal courts struggled with
whether to treat resume or application fraud differently from workplace
misconduct, especially since the former are unlikely to ever be discovered
absent discovery during litigation.74 Defendants also tried to argue that
resume and application fraud should have a looser standard than on-the-job
misconduct, in that the employer should only have to prove that it ‘would
not have hired’ the plaintiff, not that it ‘would have fired’ the plaintiff.75
However, in general, federal courts have advocated the ‘would have fired’
standard and have elected to treat resume and application fraud according
to the standards laid out in McKennon.76
Finally, the first federal courts to apply McKennon were also immediately confronted with the possibility of expanding the defense, and they
were asked to determine whether a plaintiff’s post-termination misconduct
that would have resulted in termination had the plaintiff still been employed could be used to limit damages.77 Their answers as well as more
recent responses to the issue will be discussed in the following section.
II. DOES THE MCKENNON FORMULATION OF THE DEFENSE ALLOW FOR THE
INCLUSION OF THE PLAINTIFF’S POST-TERMINATION MISCONDUCT?
The federal courts that have considered expanding the after-acquired
evidence defense to include post-termination misconduct can be sorted into
three general categories based on their responses. First, courts that claim
the plaintiff’s post-termination misconduct clearly falls outside of the scope
of the employment relationship and should not be used at all to limit damages. Second, the courts that can imagine a situation in which they would
consider post-termination misconduct when the elements of the defense
have been met, but they are not willing to definitively rule on the issue.
Finally, courts that have determined post-termination misconduct can be
73. Id. at 416.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 416 n.86.
76. See, e.g., Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 65 F.3d 1072, 1073-74 (3d. Cir. 1995); Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 374, 379 n.8 (11th Cir. 1995).
77. See, e.g., Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 879 F. Supp. 534 (W.D. Pa. 1995)(determining
that the defense could not be used to limit damages when the misconduct occurred after termination);
Sigmon v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 901 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)(same); Carr v. Woodbury County Juvenile Detention Ctr., 905 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Iowa 1995)(same).
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considered in applying the after-acquired evidence defense. These opinions
on the expansion of the defense will be examined in the following sections.
A. The After-Acquired Evidence Defense Presupposes an EmployerEmployee Relationship at the Time of the Misconduct.
The first courts to consider including post-termination misconduct
within the bounds of the after-acquired evidence defense refused to do so.
They were heavily influenced by a federal district court opinion released
prior to McKennon and that considered the issue in relation to the original
Summers doctrine. The plaintiff, in Calhoun v. Ball Corporation, took
more than 5,200 work documents after his termination without the permission of his employer, so the defendant employer asserted the after-acquired
evidence defense in a motion for summary judgment.78 The Court determined that the Summers defense presupposed that the employee was employed at the time of the misconduct.79 However, this conclusion must be
considered in light of the fact that the Summers Court concluded that afteracquired evidence acted as a complete bar to liability. The District Court
indicated that applying the Summers doctrine to post-termination misconduct seemed “harsh” because it acted as an absolute defense.80 Thus, a
discredited interpretation of the after-acquired evidence defense led to the
conclusion that post-termination misconduct should not be considered.
However, since McKennon’s interpretation of the defense did not bar all
liability, the concerns expressed by the Calhoun Court are no longer as
persuasive, and its conclusion should have been re-evaluated.
Nevertheless, shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in McKennon, several other district courts took the same approach as Calhoun and
found that the defense did not apply when the plaintiff’s alleged misconduct occurred after her termination because “[t]he McKennon decision is
premised on the employee’s misconduct occurring during her employment.”81 One District Court emphasized that the definition of afteracquired evidence “presuppose[d] that there was an employer-employee
relationship at the time the misconduct occurred, i.e., that the employee had
not yet been terminated.”82 To the extent the plaintiff’s conduct occurred
after termination, the Court would not limit the plaintiff’s available reme78. Calhoun v. Ball Corp., 866 F. Supp. 473, 475 (D. Colo. 1994).
79. Id. at 476-477 (“Summers presupposes that the employee was employed by the employer at
the time of the employee’s misconduct. Stated another way, the misconduct must have occurred before
termination.”).
80. Id. at 477.
81. Sigmon, 901 F. Supp. at 682.
82. Ryder, 879 F. Supp. at 537.
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dies, but the Court was willing to reopen discovery to determine if any of
the plaintiff’s alleged misconduct occurred while the plaintiff was still employed by the defendant.83 In a subsequent District Court case, after the
plaintiff was terminated, the defendant provided her with an office and a
telephone to use for her job search.84 While in the office, she found her
professional evaluations as well as those of other associates, and she made
copies of them for her own records.85 Since the “defendant and plaintiff
were not in an employer-employee relationship at the time of the alleged
incident,” the Court determined that “any complaint defendant [had]
against plaintiff for her post-employment conduct falls outside of the
McKennon rule, and outside of Title VII.”86 The Calhoun Court had also
made a similar observation by indicating that employers are not left without
remedies for their former employee’s post-termination misconduct because
they can turn to civil remedies or criminal sanctions depending on the conduct.87
In Carr v. Woodbury Juvenile Detention Center, another District
Court not only found that McKennon was not applicable to “after afteracquired evidence” but also indicated that it was erroneous to apply an
employer’s policies to someone, here the plaintiff, who is no longer receiving the benefits of employment.88 It determined that a presupposed condition of McKennon is that the misconduct occurred prior to termination but
the employer did not know about it.89 The implied condition of the afteracquired evidence defense is similar to a mixed-motive case where a necessary condition is that the lawful and unlawful motives both exist at the time
of termination.90 After-acquired evidence simply provides a constructive
motive for the termination, so it must be available at the time of termination.91 Equity requires some effect for the wrongdoing unknown to the
employer that occurs during employment, but when the misconduct occurs
only after employment, it “is even more distant from the employer’s deci-

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
1995).
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 538.
Sigmon, 901 F. Supp. at 674.
Id.
Id. at 683.
Calhoun v. Ball Corp., 866 F. Supp. 473, 477 (D. Colo. 1994).
Carr v. Woodbury County Juvenile Detention Ctr., 905 F. Supp. 619, 627-29 (N.D. Iowa
Id. at 627.
Id. at 628.
Id.
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sion-making process, because the misconduct is not temporally related to
the decision as well as unknown to the employer.”92
In Carr, the defendant discovered that after termination, the plaintiff
had tested positive in a urine analysis for marijuana use.93 The defendant
argued that this made the plaintiff unsuitable for employment, especially in
light of its policy stating, “[a]ny employee found guilty of indulgence in a
controlled substance without seeking treatment will be discharged.”94 The
Court determined that the employer’s policies could not be imposed on a
person after employment had terminated because “[i]t would be grossly
inequitable to hold [her] to all of the burdens of [the employer’s] policies at
a time when she is not receiving any of the benefits of County employment.”95 In addition, the Court found it especially relevant that the employer suffered no detriment from the plaintiff’s marijuana use because it did
not relate to her employment.96
Even though the employer was not negatively impacted by her postemployment conduct, the Carr Court did not consider the impact her marijuana use would have on possible reinstatement.97 The plaintiff worked at a
juvenile detention center, so her marijuana use, while not relevant to liability for discrimination, may have been relevant to her ability or qualification
to return to her job and to continue to work with youth.98 This logic is similar to that expressed in McKennon where the Supreme Court emphasized
that reinstatement would be pointless if the employer has a nondiscriminatory reason to terminate the plaintiff.99
More recently, in a failure to rehire case, the Fifth Circuit determined
that the plaintiff’s conduct of taking her personnel file after leaving the
Sherriff’s department could not be used to assert the after-acquired evidence defense.100 The defendant did not know about her actions because
the plaintiff’s conduct occurred after the defendant decided not to hire
her.101 Thus, the defendant cannot establish “that any wrongdoing was of

92. Id. This notion that post-termination misconduct is even more distant from the employer’s
decision-making process may not be entirely accurate. It is possible that pre-hire or on-the-job misconduct occurred at a time much more distant from the decision to terminate than misconduct that occurs
shortly after termination. See O’Brien, supra note 64, at 173.
93. Carr, 905 F. Supp. at 621.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 629.
96. Id. at 628-29.
97. See O’Brien, supra note 64, at 168.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Vaughn v. Sabine County, 104 F. App’x 980, 987-88 (5th Cir. 2004).
101. Id. at 988.
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such severity that the wrongdoing alone would have resulted in the [plaintiff’s] termination.”102 The Court did not find post-termination conduct to
be relevant, as it could not be the basis for the defendant’s failure to rehire
the plaintiff.103
B. The After-Acquired Evidence Defense Might Extend to Post-Termination
Misconduct.
Some federal courts have been willing to consider permitting the use
of post-termination misconduct to limit damages as long as the posttermination misconduct did not arise as a result of the defendant’s discrimination or wrongful termination. The Tenth Circuit in Medlock v. Ortho
Biotech, Inc. was the first court to express this view and to indicate that
post-termination conduct may limit relief in certain circumstances, even
though in the circumstances of this case it did not.104 The Court focused on
the McKennon language encouraging courts to consider the unique “factual
permutations and the equitable considerations” of each case individually in
determining whether to limit relief.105 The defendant in Medlock argued
that the jury instructions at the district court were improper when they did
not include the after-acquired evidence defense because the plaintiff’s conduct of touching and cursing at defendant’s counsel during his unemployment compensation benefits hearing that occurred post-termination would
have led to his discharge.106 The Tenth Circuit determined that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to use the defendant’s jury
instructions on the issue of damages.107 The post-termination misconduct
occurred during a hearing that was concerned with the plaintiff’s wrongful
termination.108 “In this case, as in most cases in which the alleged misconduct arises as a direct result of retaliatory termination, the necessary balancing of the equities hardly mandates a McKennon-type instruction on the
after-occurring evidence.”109 The Medlock Court was especially concerned
with the possibility of “a defendant goading a former employee into losing
102. Id.
103. Todd J. McNamara & Kristina James, Post Termination Conduct and the After-Acquired
Evidence Rule: An Arrow on Target or an Empty Quiver?, TRIAL TALK, June-July 2005, at 29, 30,
available at http://www.18thavelaw.com/news/2005-06-01-employment.pdf.
104. Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 555 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e do not foreclose
the possibility that in appropriate circumstances the logic of McKennon may permit certain limitations
on relief based on post-termination conduct.”).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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her temper, only to claim later that certain forms of relief should be unavailable because it would have discharged the plaintiff based on her inability to control her temper.”110 Thus, the Tenth Circuit articulated a
limitation on the use of post-termination misconduct that considers the
purposes behind federal anti-discrimination statutes such as deterring discrimination in the workplace and providing retribution to those who are
discriminated against.
Following the reasoning in Medlock, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the defendant’s partial motion for summary judgment on the issue of damages.111 The defendant argued that the plaintiff was ineligible for reinstatement and also ineligible
for front pay because she “was convicted of simple assault and making
terroristic threats in an incident at [defendant’s] store.”112 After considering
the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Sellers v. Mineta, discussed in the following section, and the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Medlock, the Court “[found]
it premature to weigh the equities regarding front pay” because it determined that the concerns expressed in Medlock could be applicable here, as
the incidents occurred at the defendant’s store.113 Thus, it is possible that
the actions of the defendant contributed to the plaintiff’s conduct.
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit indicated that it was willing to consider
employee misconduct that occurs after some sort of adverse action was
taken by the employer, but as in Medlock, it should not apply to limit recovery when the “misconduct can be attributable to the defendant’s prior
illegal action.”114 In this case, the plaintiff’s wrongful conduct in violating
the defendant’s policies occurred while he was on medical leave and still
an employee, so his conduct did not exactly occur after termination.115
However, the Court determined that the defendant’s actions caused the
plaintiff’s misconduct because if the defendant had not wrongfully imposed
medical restrictions, making the plaintiff unfit to work, then the plaintiff
would not have been forced to seek employment without the defendant’s
permission in violation of its policies.116
The District Court in Cohen v. Gulfstream Training Academy, Inc.
took a slightly different approach to the applicability of post-termination
misconduct to the after-acquired evidence defense and was willing to con110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at n.7.
Smyth v. Wawa, Inc., No. 06-4474, 2008 WL 741036, at *18 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
Id. at *16.
Id. at *17-18.
Jones v. Nissan North America, Inc., 438 F. App’x. 388, 407 (6th Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id.
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sider it when it flows from pre-termination misconduct. The Court denied
the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the defendant’s assertion
of the after-acquired evidence defense.117 The defendant claimed that it
would have terminated the plaintiff if it had known he was setting up a
competing business, and the plaintiff contended that McKennon did not
govern because the evidence used to support the defense occurred posttermination.118
Plaintiff distinguishes Crapp (police officer) and Sellers (Federal Aviation Administration employee) as cases involving a plaintiff’s loss of
government certifications required to perform the previous job. However, what the Court finds significant in Crapp, Sellers and the present case
is that the post-termination evidence directly flows from the conduct that
occurred pre-termination. In Crapp and Sellers, the loss of a certification
precluded the ability to perform the previous job. In the present case, the
post-termination evidence of Cohen’s actions corroborate the pretermination evidence of beginning to set up a competing business.119

The Court decided not to exclude the post-termination evidence because it could be used to support the proposition that the plaintiff took certain actions to set up a competing business prior to termination.120
Therefore, the Cohen Court was unwilling to consider exclusively posttermination misconduct, but it was willing to permit defendants to use it to
develop misconduct that occurred during the employment relationship.
Similarly, in a more recent case, the District Court for the Northern
District of Indiana considered both post-termination misconduct and onthe-job misconduct when it determined that the plaintiff’s violations of the
employer’s policies made the after-acquired evidence defense applicable.121 The plaintiff took proprietary documents after termination in violation of the defendant’s Information Safeguarding Policy.122 The plaintiff
also failed to report a potential infraction in violation of the AntiHarassment Policy.123 For its decision, the Court considered both posttermination misconduct and on-the-job misconduct, so it is not possible to
determine definitively if the after-acquired evidence defense would still
apply if the misconduct had only occurred post-termination.
Other federal courts have been unwilling to hold that there are no circumstances in which post-termination misconduct could be used to limit
117. Cohen v. Gulfstream Training Academy, Inc., No. 07-60331-CIV, 2008 WL 961472, at *3
(S.D. Fla. 2008).
118. Id. at *2.
119. Id. at *3. For a discussion on both Crapp and Sellers, see infra Part II.C.
120. Id. at *3.
121. Treat v. Tom Kelley Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 2d 762, 777 (N.D. Ind. 2010).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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damages.124 In Ellis v. Cygnus Enterprises, the plaintiff brought a motion
to strike the defendant’s affirmative defense, which asserted that the
“[p]laintiff’s post-termination misconduct consisting of threats and purported extortion rendered him unsuitable for employment.”125 The Court
was unwilling to strike the defense.126 “Although this Court is not entirely
convinced that [the plaintiff’s] post-termination activities can serve as the
basis for limiting his equitable damages, the Court cannot affirmatively
rule, given the lack of Second Circuit precedent, that there are no circumstances under which the defense could be successful.”127
C. The After-Acquired Evidence Defense Extends to Post-Termination Misconduct.
Some federal courts have found that the plaintiff’s post-termination
misconduct can affect his available remedies and can be included in the
after-acquired evidence defense. In Crapp v. City of Miami Beach, the
Eleventh Circuit determined that a plaintiff’s loss of certification to be a
police officer after his termination limited the availability of backpay and
reinstatement.128 The plaintiff, a black police officer, brought suit under
Title VII alleging that his termination was racially motivated, and he was
awarded compensatory damages, backpay, and reinstatement.129 However,
reinstatement was stayed, while the Florida Department of Law Enforcement investigated the plaintiff’s certification to be a police officer.130 The
investigation resulted in his decertification for conduct unbecoming an
officer for two years, beginning with the date of his termination.131 The
District Court determined that the principles of McKennon required the
award of backpay and reinstatement to be vacated, and the Eleventh Circuit
agreed.132 The plaintiff’s loss of certification made the defendant unable to
employ him as a police officer, so it was proper to vacate the award of

124. See Sanders v. Madison Square Garden, L.P., No. 06 CIV. 589 (GEL), 2007 WL 2254698, at
*12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2007) opinion withdrawn in part on reconsideration, 525 F. Supp. 2d 364
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“The Second Circuit has never had occasion to decide whether post-employment
misconduct can support an after-acquired evidence defense . . . . It is unnecessary to rule on this legal
issue to decide defendants’ motion.”).
125. Ellis v. Cygnus Enterprises, LLC, No. CV 11-771 (SJF) (AKT), 2012 WL 259913, at *2-3
(E.D.N.Y. 2012).
126. Id. at *5.
127. Id. at *3.
128. Crapp v. City of Miami Beach, 242 F.3d 1017, 1021 (11th Cir. 2001).
129. Id. at 1018-19.
130. Id. at 1019.
131. Id. at 1019 n.5.
132. See id. at 1019-21.
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backpay and reinstatement.133 However, the jury determined that the defendant’s decision to fire the plaintiff was racially motivated, so the award
of compensatory damages was appropriate in order to compensate him for
the discrimination and to deter the defendant from future acts of discrimination.134
The Eighth Circuit in Sellers v. Mineta held that a plaintiff’s posttermination conduct was relevant to the availability of front pay when a
plaintiff’s post-termination conduct made her ineligible for reinstatement.135 The Court found that the previous district courts that considered
including post-termination misconduct in the after-acquired evidence defense had read McKennon too narrowly, especially in regards to the
McKennon instructions indicating that courts need to evaluate the equitable
considerations of each case individually.136 There are clearly circumstances
in which post-termination misconduct would be relevant to limiting relief.137 For example, if after termination a plaintiff was convicted of a
crime unrelated to the former position with the defendant and was then
incarcerated because of it, this would make reinstatement impossible.138
The Eighth Circuit found that “[s]imple common sense tells us that it
would be inequitable to award [the plaintiff] front pay in lieu of reinstatement where she had rendered herself actually unable to be reinstated.”139
This is especially obvious in light of the nature of front pay as a disfavored
remedy that should only be awarded in place of reinstatement when “reinstatement is impractical or impossible due to circumstances not attributable
to the plaintiff.”140 Furthermore, federal courts have concluded that a front
pay award is precluded when the plaintiff unreasonably rejects an offer of
reinstatement, so similarly, “post-termination misconduct of a type that
renders an employee actually unable to be reinstated or ineligible for reinstatement should also be one of the ‘factual permutations’ which is relevant
in determining whether a front pay award is appropriate.”141

133. Id. at 1021.
134. Id.
135. Sellers v. Mineta, 358 F.3d 1058, 1064 (8th Cir. 2004).
136. Id. at 1063.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1063-64. “It would be inequitable for a plaintiff to avail herself of the disfavored and
exceptional remedy of front pay where her own misconduct precludes her from availing herself of the
favored and more traditional remedy of reinstatement.” Id. at 1064.
141. Id. at 1064. Here, the Sellers Court is referencing the language found in the McKennon decision.
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In Sellers, the plaintiff brought an action based on Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 when she was terminated from her position as an
Air Traffic Control Specialist.142 During the litigation, she was employed at
Bank of America, and the jury ultimately returned a verdict in her favor.143
However, after the trial, the plaintiff was terminated from Bank of America
for attempting to process an unauthorized loan application for her spouse’s
former wife.144 The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s conduct after termination was relevant to the availability of reinstatement or front pay as a
remedy because it made her unsuitable for reinstatement as an air traffic
controller.145 Based on the Court’s decision to consider post-termination
misconduct as one of the relevant equitable considerations for determining
the appropriate remedy, the Sellers Court remanded the case for a determination of whether the plaintiffs’ post-termination conduct “render[ed] her
ineligible for reinstatement under the [defendant’s] employment regulations, policies, and actual employment practices.”146 The Court emphasized
that “[f]ront pay is an alternative remedy to reinstatement and should be
unavailable where the plaintiff’s own conduct prevented reinstatement.”147
Relying on Medlock and Sellers, the District Court for the Northern
District of Oklahoma determined that the plaintiff’s post-termination misconduct could not be presented to a jury but courts should consider it when
determining the equitable remedy of front pay.148 The plaintiffs brought a
motion in limine in order to ask the Court to exclude facts concerning an
alcohol-related arrest and misdemeanor charge that occurred after termination.149 The Court found that the incident was not relevant for jury purposes because courts decide the availability of equitable remedies such as front
pay.150 However, after the jury returned a verdict, the Court would consider
the evidence in deciding whether to award front pay.151 The plaintiff’s
arrest and subsequent incarceration might have made him unfit for employment if he had not been previously terminated.152 The Court explained
that the circumstances of the case were distinguishable from the circum142. Id. at 1059.
143. Id. at 1060.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1065.
147. Id.
148. Lunsford v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of County of Rogers, No. 05-CV-0218CVE-FHM, 2006
WL 2679578, at *8 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 18, 2006).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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stances in Medlock and the concerns expressed by the Tenth Circuit because the plaintiff’s misconduct was independent of the alleged retaliatory
termination.153
In McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found the reasoning in Sellers to be
persuasive and was willing to consider post-termination conduct that made
the plaintiff ineligible for rehire or would justify termination, unless the
conduct was attributable to the defendant.154 The plaintiff after his termination from the police department was arrested for possession of marijuana
and subsequently convicted of knowingly possessing marijuana.155 The
defendant asserted that the police department did not tolerate any drug use,
including marijuana use, by its officers and that if the plaintiff had still
been employed at the time of his conviction, he would have ultimately been
terminated.156 Based on this assertion, the defendant argued that the afteracquired evidence defense was applicable to cut-off backpay and front pay
as to the date the defendant learned of the conviction.157
The District Court found this evidence relevant to determining the
plaintiff’s equitable remedies because the broad language in McKennon
supported including post-termination conduct within the defense.158
Where a plaintiff has engaged in conduct after leaving the defendant’s
employ that would justify refusing to re-hire him, or justify terminating
him if he had remained employed at the defendant, then that fact should
be taken into account in calculating equitable damages in order to take
“due account of the lawful prerogatives of the employer in the usual
course of its business and the corresponding equities that it has arising
from the employee’s wrongdoing.”159

In addition, the District Court found that the defendant had established
that the plaintiff’s misconduct was severe enough to justify termination, as
required by McKennon.160 However, it was necessary to determine if there
was a causal relationship between the unlawful discrimination and the
plaintiff’s conduct because “a plaintiff’s post-termination wrongdoing must
not be attributable to the defendant’s conduct.”161 Here, the McKenna
Court found it inequitable to cut off the plaintiff’s backpay because there

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 636 F. Supp. 2d 446, 461 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
Id. at 454.
Id.
Id. at 459.
Id. at 461.
Id. (quoting McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 361 (1995)).
Id. at 461-62.
Id. at 462. The Court applied the limitation expressed in Medlock. Id.
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were sufficient facts, such as the plaintiff’s inability to treat his depression
without medical insurance, to find that the plaintiff’s marijuana use was
causally related to the discrimination.162 “Although the Court has found
that after-acquired evidence of a plaintiff’s post-termination misconduct
can cut off an award of back pay in appropriate circumstances, it should
only do so where that misconduct is independent of the defendant’s wrongdoing.”163
III. THE AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DEFENSE SHOULD EXPAND TO
INCLUDE POST-TERMINATION MISCONDUCT BY THE PLAINTIFF IN CERTAIN
CIRCUMSTANCES.
A. McKennon Does Not Require the Misconduct to Occur During the Employment Relationship.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in McKennon does not require a plaintiff’s misconduct to occur during the employment relationship. The Supreme Court referred to employee “wrongdoing,” not employee on the job
misconduct.164 It also directed lower federal courts to consider the “factual
permutations and equitable considerations” of each case.165 The Third Circuit emphasized this when it stated, “[T]he Supreme Court did not limit the
general principles articulated in McKennon to cases involving on-the-job
misconduct, instead using the broader term ‘wrongdoing’ as well as listing
both types of after-acquired evidence cases (resume fraud and cases of onthe-job misconduct).”166 This terminology is one reason federal courts
decided to apply the defense to resume and application fraud, with little
hesitation after McKennon.167 In fact, in any situation of plaintiff misconduct, pre-hire, on-the-job, or post-termination, the defendant was entirely
unaware of the wrongdoing when it made its decision to discriminate
against or terminate the plaintiff. Thus, in the context of the defense, there
is little reason to distinguish between wrongdoing that occurs before termination or after termination because in every case it is always discovered
after the defendant’s unlawful act.
Some scholars have even indicated that pre-hire misconduct such as
resume fraud is logically similar to post-termination misconduct because
the plaintiff’s misconduct occurred when there was not an established em162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 463.
Id. at 464.
See McKennon, 513 U.S. at 361.
Id.
Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 65 F.3d 1072, 1074 n.4 (3d Cir. 1995).
Hart, supra note 2, at 416.
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ployment relationship, though no federal courts have yet reiterated this
view.168 Any arguments suggesting that the post-termination misconduct is
too distant from the defendant’s decision-making process to be included in
the after-acquired evidence doctrine have to be considered in light of the
recognition that instances of pre-hire misconduct (or even on-the-job misconduct) might actually occur at a much more distant time from the defendant’s decision.169 Post-termination misconduct to be asserted as a
defense in a lawsuit must occur at some time between termination and the
end of the litigation, but an instance of resume fraud could potentially occur years before the defendant’s discriminatory termination. However, it
can be argued that instances of resume or application fraud may have influenced the employer’s decision to hire that particular plaintiff, effectively
starting the employment relationship, while post-termination misconduct
clearly falls outside of the employment relationship.
In addition, the McKennon Court supported a balancing of the lawful
prerogatives of the defendant in running its business with the purposes of
federal anti-discrimination employment statutes, mainly deterrence and the
remedial interests in making the plaintiff, who was wrongly discriminated
against, whole.170 The balance between these two competing interests does
not indicate that post-termination misconduct should be treated differently
than on-the-job or pre-hire misconduct. The defendant employer has a legitimate and lawful interest in not reinstating someone whose conduct has
made him or her ineligible for reinstatement or whose conduct would have
resulted in a lawful termination. As the Sellers Court expressed, front pay
should not be available when the plaintiff’s own wrongdoing made reinstatement impossible.171 Furthermore, the McKennon articulation of the
defense did not impact other types of damages, such as compensatory damages for the emotional distress or even punitive damages if the defendant’s
actions were reprehensible, that are available to the plaintiff depending on
the particular federal statute. These damages can provide retribution for the
plaintiff and can work to deter future discrimination by employers.
B. The Purposes of Front Pay and Other Equitable Remedies Support the
Consideration of Post-Termination Misconduct in the Remedial Stage.
The plaintiff’s wrongdoing does not justify the unlawful actions of the
defendant, but equity requires the wrongdoing to be considered. As empha168.
169.
170.
171.

See O’Brien, supra note 64, at 168.
Id. at 173. This is a response to the argument in Carr.
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358-61 (1995).
Sellers v. Mineta, 358 F.3d 1058, 1064 (8th Cir. 2004).
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sized by the Supreme Court, the employer’s legitimate interests need to be
taken into account when deciding whether equitable remedies are available
to the plaintiff.172 Equitable remedies are used to make the plaintiff
whole,173 or “to restore the employee to the position he or she would have
been in absent the discrimination.”174 In the context of employment discrimination, the available equitable remedies are backpay, front pay, and
reinstatement.175 Equitable remedies are not intended to place the plaintiff
in a better position than she would have been absent the discrimination.
For instance, backpay is intended to compensate a plaintiff for the
wages she would have received but for the discriminatory actions of the
defendant, and it is typically calculated from the date of termination
through the rendering of the verdict.176 However, in McKennon, the Supreme Court determined that successful application of the after-acquired
evidence defense required backpay to be cut off earlier, at the date the defendant discovered the misconduct.177 If an award of backpay was not cut
off at that time, then possibly the plaintiff would be in a better place than
she would have been absent the discrimination because, as required by the
defense, she would have been fired for the wrongdoing. Arguably, this
same result could occur even when a plaintiff’s wrongdoing occurred posttermination such as in the case of the incarcerated plaintiff.
Similarly, an award of front pay or reinstatement “would be inappropriate where it would ‘catapult the plaintiff into a better position than [he]
would have enjoyed in the absence of discrimination.’”178 Front pay is only
awarded in lieu of reinstatement when reinstatement is impractical or impossible for reasons not attributable to the plaintiff.179 Generally, reinstatement is not awarded when there is workplace hostility from the
discrimination litigation.180 However, as the Sellers Court articulated, when
the plaintiff, through her own actions, becomes ineligible for reinstatement,
it would be inequitable to award front pay instead.181 For example, a plaintiff that loses a required certification for her job, even when the loss occurs
172. See McKennon, 513 U.S. at 361.
173. See Valerie Harris, Front Pay and Sexual Harassment Cases: What It Is, Why It Is Important
and How to Make It Better, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 217, 225 (2000).
174. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362.
175. See Harris, supra note 173, at 226-27.
176. Id. at 226.
177. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362.
178. McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 636 F.Supp.2d 446, 466 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (quoting Donlin v.
Philips Lighting N Am. Corp., 564 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2009)).
179. See Sellers v. Mineta, 358 F.3d 1058, 1063-64 (8th Cir. 2004).
180. See Harris, supra note 173 at 225.
181. Sellers, 358 F.3d at 1064.
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after termination, should not be awarded front pay because her own actions
made her ineligible for reinstatement to her former position. It would be
inequitable in this situation to ignore the plaintiff’s wrongdoing, especially
in light of the legitimate business considerations of the defendant. Thus, in
some circumstances, post-termination misconduct must be considered in
order to promote the goal of restoring the plaintiff without putting the
plaintiff in a better position than she would have been absent the discrimination.
C. The McKennon Principles Should Apply to a Plaintiff’s PostTermination Misconduct Unrelated to the Employer’s Discrimination.
The plaintiff’s post-termination misconduct should be included in the
after-acquired evidence defense as articulated in McKennon, just as on-thejob misconduct and resume fraud are included. The defendant must establish that if the plaintiff had still been employed it would have terminated
the plaintiff, based on the defendant’s actual employment practices. In addition, since this requires hypothetical analysis, it may be necessary to consider if the post-termination misconduct makes the plaintiff ineligible for
reinstatement. The Sellers Court stated the most obvious example, when it
described a plaintiff who is convicted of a crime and then incarcerated.182
In this situation, the plaintiff clearly could not be reinstated, and most employers would terminate an employee who was incarcerated. However,
some post-termination misconduct will be much less clear on whether or
not the defendant would fire the plaintiff for the conduct if he had still been
employed.
Courts will have to consider the unique factual permutations of each
individual case in relation to the post-termination misconduct, just as instructed by the McKennon decision. Federal courts, in determining whether
the plaintiff’s misconduct would have resulted in termination if the plaintiff
had still been employed, can consider the nature of the defendant’s business and the seriousness of the plaintiff’s misconduct in relation to that
business. For example, if the plaintiff’s post-termination misconduct concerns stealing the employer’s confidential documents, the seriousness of
this misconduct may be different depending on the defendant’s policies and
the nature of the defendant’s business. In addition, courts should also consider whether the misconduct affects the plaintiff’s ability or qualifications
to perform her prior job.183 The plaintiff’s inability to perform her prior job
182. Id. at 1063.
183. See O’Brien, supra note 64, at 168.
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will make reinstatement impossible, which, as already indicated, should
prevent the award of front pay. Courts should also determine whether the
plaintiff’s misconduct was particularly egregious or criminal in nature,
which generally supports a decision by the employer to terminate for the
conduct, as the misconduct is more severe.184
Finally, not all post-termination misconduct by the plaintiff should be
considered when limiting damages through the after-acquired evidence
defense. The post-termination misconduct should not be attributable to the
defendant’s wrongful and discriminatory actions because this would go
against the purposes of anti-discrimination employment statutes. Defendants should not benefit when their discriminatory actions lead to or cause
the plaintiff’s misconduct. Courts must decide whether the unlawful discrimination was the cause of the plaintiff’s misconduct.
The concern expressed by the Tenth Circuit in Medlock is a perfect
example of post-termination misconduct that should not be used to limit
damages through the after-acquired evidence defense. The Court described
a situation where the defendant goads the former employee into losing her
temper or threatening the defendant and then the defendant attempts to use
her behavior to limit damages “based on her inability to control her temper.”185 In this situation, the defendant not only initiated the plaintiff’s
reaction, but because of the defendant’s discrimination and the emotional
distress associated with it, the plaintiff may be more susceptible to the defendant’s provocation. Thus, when the plaintiff’s wrongdoing occurs after
termination, it must be independent from the discrimination the plaintiff
suffered and not attributable to the defendant’s unlawful actions.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in McKennon articulated the afteracquired evidence defense as applied to federal employment discrimination
cases, and it, as well as the purposes behind the defense and the purposes in
awarding equitable remedies, supports the premise that post-termination
misconduct by the plaintiff should be included within the defense. McKennon emphasized that the plaintiff’s wrongdoing should be considered when
determining the appropriate remedies after liability is established. This
focus on wrongdoing supports the inclusion of post-termination wrongdoing, as well as on-the-job or pre-hire wrongdoing, by the plaintiff. In addition, equitable remedies, especially front pay, are intended to place the
184. See id. at 172.
185. Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 555 n.7 (10th Cir. 1999).
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plaintiff in the position he would have been absent the discrimination. If
post-termination misconduct is not considered, then in some circumstances,
a plaintiff may end up in a position better than he would have been in absent the discrimination. Equitable remedies are not intended to provide the
plaintiff with a windfall. However, post-termination wrongdoing that is
attributable to the defendant’s discrimination should not be used to limit
damages because defendants should not benefit from their discriminatory
conduct. Federal courts have to consider the unique factual circumstances
of each case when fashioning the appropriate remedies for the plaintiff, and
hence, in some cases, this will require the court to consider posttermination wrongdoing when applying the after-acquired evidence defense.

